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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper examines immigrants' rights under federal law.
In doing so, this paper will not use the traditional terms "illegal
immigrants" or "illegal aliens," but instead will use the term
"undocumented immigrants." The difference between the two
groups being that documented immigrants have followed the pro-
cedures set out by the federal government to obtain documenta-
tion evidencing their legal status in the United States, while
undocumented immigrants have not obtained such documenta-
tion.
This author deems it inaccurate to refer to a group of people
* Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2009, University of Miami School of Law. B.A.,
Bellevue University. I would like to thank Professor David Abraham and my wife,
Sarah Gruhn, for all of their help.
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as "illegal" simply because they have committed a criminal act by
entering the United States without obtaining permission from the
government. The same adjective is not used to describe American
citizens who have committed crimes such as murder or rape, even
though in these circumstances such a description would seem
more fitting. The term is even avoided when describing those who
are involved in continuing crimes, such as repeated tax evasion. A
person may commit a crime, such as immigrating to America in
contravention of federal law, but that does not make them illegal,
just as one who does not pay his taxes has committed a crime but
they are not referred to as "illegal." Thus, it is more accurate to
describe them as undocumented immigrants. Elie Wiesel, a pro-
lific novelist, Nobel Laureate and Holocaust survivor, proposed
this idea when he wrote: "You who are so-called illegal aliens must
know that no human being is 'illegal.' That is a contradiction in
terms. Human beings can be beautiful or more beautiful, can be
right or wrong, but illegal? How can a human being be illegal?"1
Immigration has been a controversial topic since time imme-
morial.2 Recently, immigration has been the subject of intense
moral and political debate. Much of this discourse is born out of
the mass influx of immigrants from Latin American countries,
many of whom are believed to be undocumented.4
1. Elie Wiesel, The Refugee, in SANCTUARY: A RESOURCE GUIDE FOR
UNDERSTANDING AND PARTICIPATING IN THE CENTRAL AMERICAN
REFUGEES' STRUGGLE (Gary MacEoin ed., 1985).
2. See Industrial Relations Counselors, Inc., http://ircounselors.org/irconcepts/
1999fall.html (describing immigration legislation and trends in America since the
Founding); see also U.S. immigration history, http://www.visa2003.com/world-
immigration/us-history.htm (tracing immigration patterns since America's inception
and the debate that followed each pattern).
3. Immigration debate has been the centerpiece of the recent presidential
campaigns with candidates stressing the moral aspects involved. See Leslie Wayne, In
New Ad, Romney Attacks Huckabee on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2007,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2OO7/12/11/us/politics/llhuckabee.html
(describing a typical immigration debate between politicians); see also Stephen
Steinlight, Immigration, Mainstream Media, and the 2008 Election, Center for
Immigration Studies (2008), available at http://www.cis.org/articles/2007/backll07.
html (detailing the role played by the immigration debate in the 2008 presidential
election).
4. As of March 2005, there were an estimated 35.2 million documented and
undocumented immigrants in the United States. Steven A. Camarota, Immigrants at
Mid-Decade: A Snapshot of America's Foreign-Born Population in 2005, Center for
Immigration Studies (2005), available at http://www.cis.org/articles/2005/
backl405.html. Between January 2000 and March 2005, 7.9 million new immigrants
entered the United States, which is the highest volume of new immigration in
America's history. Id. Of that 35.2 million, 58% arrived from Latin-American
Countries. Id. The number of undocumented immigrants contained in the 35.2 million
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This has led many individuals, including several politicians,
to clamor for immigration reform.5 In 2006, President Bush advo-
cated a complete overhaul of federal immigration legislation.6 Yet,
Congress was unable to agree on the best course of action to quell
the volume of undocumented immigrants crossing America's bor-
ders.' It currently appears that Congress has all but abandoned
the search for a workable federal solution to the problems that
many citizens claim follow the settling of undocumented immi-
grants in America's cities and towns.'
Many local officials have passed, or are in the process of
enacting, their own immigration laws in the face of what they per-
ceive to be a wholesale failure of the federal government to control
immigration.9 The majority of such legislation focuses on regulat-
ing employers who hire undocumented immigrants and landlords
who provide housing to undocumented immigrants. While both
attempts at regulation warrant discussion and analysis, this
paper will focus solely on the affects such ordinances have on the
housing prospects of Latin American immigrants.
The trend of local government ventures into immigration reg-
ulation began in San Bernardino, California, where a group of citi-
zens calling themselves "Save our State," submitted legislation
that would have imposed fines on employers who hired undocu-
estimate is difficult to ascertain but is estimated to be around 11 million Id. The
percentage of undocumented immigrants coming to America from Latin-American
countries is difficult to estimate but there is no reason to believe that it is lower than
the general statistics on immigration. In fact, there is good reason to believe that it is
higher than the general estimate given the relatively easy access to America's borders
available to citizens of Latin-American countries. DAVID W. HAINES & KAREN E.
ROSENBLUM, ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION IN AMERICA: A REFERENCE
HANDBOOK 28 (Greenwood Press 1999) (stating that in 1995 Mexican immigrants
accounted for 54% of undocumented immigrants and Central American immigrants
accounted for 15% of the undocumented immigrant population).
5. Kate Phillips, The Immigration Debate, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2007, available at
http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com /2007/05/18/the-immigration-debate/ (outlining
the arguments made for immigration reform by many citizens, politicians and
political pundits).
6. President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation on Immigration Reform
(May 15, 2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/05/
20060515-8.html.
7. See Jonathan Weisman, Immigration Overhaul Bill Stalls in Senate, WASH.
POST, June 8, 2007, at Al.
8. Carl Hulse & Rachael L. Swarns, G.O.P. Sets Aside Work in Immigration, N.Y.
TIMES, Sep. 5, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/O9/05/us/O5cong.
html?pagewanted=print.
9. Database of Local Immigration Ordinances, http://www.fairimmigration.org
learnimmigration-reform-and-immigrants/local-level/database-of-ordinances.html
(listing local ordinances from 111 cities in 26 states and the status of each law).
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mented immigrants and fined landlords who rented to undocu-
mented immigrants. 10 The purpose of the proposed ordinance was
to rid the city of undocumented immigrants.11 Save our State
believed that the influx of undocumented immigrants had
resulted in, among other things, an increased crime rate and a
decline in the school system.12 The ordinance was turned down by
the city council13 and eventually defeated in court for failure to
obtain enough signatures to be placed on a ballot.14
Although the San Bernardino ordinance was never enacted, it
served as a model for a wave of similar ordinances that swept
across the country like wildfire.15 Soon after the San Bernardino
initiative was laid to rest, Hazleton, Pennsylvania, attempted to
enact an ordinance aimed at ousting undocumented immigrants. 6
Once again, the stated purpose for the ordinance was to combat
increased crime, declining property values and to provide for the
general health and safety of the city's residents. 7
The Hazleton ordinance was nearly identical to the law that
the San Bernardino City Council refused to enact and which sub-
sequently failed to receive enough signatures to be placed on a bal-
lot. 1 8 The Hazleton ordinance allowed for any citizen or official to
file a complaint asserting that a landlord was renting to an
undocumented immigrant. 9 Under the ordinance, the complaint
would be deemed valid as long as it was in writing, gave enough
detail for the city to determine when, where and who was violat-
10. The text of the initiative is available at http://www.campaignsitebuilder.com/
templates/displayfiles/tmp68.asp?SiteID=843&PageID=12139&Trial=false.
11. Id. at § 2.
12. Id.
13. Cindy Chang, California City Council Rejects Anti-Immigration Legislation,
N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/16/us/
16bernardino.html.
14. Judge Rules Against San Bernardino Illegal Immigrant Petition, IMMIGRATION
WATCHDOG, June 26, 2006, available at http://www.immigrationwatchdog.com/
?p=1409 (stating that Judge A. Rex Victor ruled that the initiative did not receive
enough votes to qualify for a public vote).
15. See David Fried, Local Illegal Immigration Laws Draw a Diverse Group of
Cities, NORTH CoUNTY TIMES, Sep. 2, 2006, available at http://www.nctimes.coml
articles/2006/09/03/news/topstories/21_40_499_2_06.txt.
16. HAZLETON, PA., Ordinance 2006-18 (2006), passed Sep. 8, 2006, available at
http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/immigrants/hazleton-secondordinance.pdf
17. Id.
18. Compare HAZLETON, PA., Ordinance 2006-18 (2006), supra note 16 with the
San Bernardino Ordinance available at http://www.campaignsitebuilder.com/
templates/displayfiles/tmpl68.asp?SiteID=843&PageID=12139&Trial=false
19. HAZLETON, PA., Ordinance 2006-18, passed Sep. 8, 2006, available at http:l!
www.aclu.org/pdfs/immigrants/hazleton-secondordinance.pdf.
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ing the law and it did not rely solely on race or national origin as
grounds for the belief that a violation had occurred.2 °
The Hazleton law was challenged in federal court and in July
2007, Judge Munley ruled that the ordinance was unenforceable,
writing that the law violated several constitutional rights, as well
as the Supremacy Clause.21 Prior to Judge Munley's decision,
numerous other localities enacted similar ordinances. The most
representative and noteworthy of these local ordinances are those
passed in Riverside, New Jersey, Farmers Branch, Texas, Valley
Park, Missouri and Escondido, California.22 Each city's stated
goal is to protect the health, safety and welfare of their communi-
ties.2" Each follows a nearly identical path to achieve that objec-
tive by attempting to regulate employers who hire undocumented
immigrants, as well as landlords who rent to undocumented
immigrants.24
Along the way it appears that all of these laws run afoul of
federal legislation by encroaching on Congress' constitutionally
prescribed power to regulate immigration. 25 The vast majority of
immigrants, both documented and undocumented, come to
America from Latin-American countries.26 In particular, the
towns and cities where the abovementioned ordinances were, or
are, in effect have relatively large Latin immigrant population.27
20. The ordinance was amended in 2007 during trial proceedings to eliminate the
language that would deem a complaint adequate as long as the sole basis was not race
or national origin. HAZLETON, PA., Ordinance 2007-06 (2007).
21. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 555 (2007) (holding that
federal law preempted the ordinance, that the ordinance violated due process
protections, infringed on plaintiffs' rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and violated several
state provided rights).
22. RIVERSIDE, N.J., Ordinance 2006-26 (2006); FARMERS BRANCH, TEX.,
Ordinance 2892 (2007); VALLEY PARK, MO., Ordinance 1736 (2006); ESCONDIDO,
CAL., Ordinance 2006-38 (2006).
23. RIVERSIDE, N.J., Ordinance 2006-26, §166-2 (2006); FARMERS BRANCH,
TEX., Ordinance 2892 (2007); VALLEY PARK, MO. Ordinance 1736, §2(c) & (d)
(2006); ESCONDIDO, CAL., Ordinance 2006-38, §1(5) (2006).
24. See RIVERSIDE, N.J., Ordinance 2006-26 (2006); see also FARMERS
BRANCH, TEX., Ordinance 2892 (2007); VALLEY PARK, MO. Ordinance 1715
(2006); ESCONDIDO, CAL., Resolution 2007-16 (2007).
25. Congress shall have the power to "establish a uniform rule of naturalization
.... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; see also Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 42 (1915) ("The
authority to control immigration-to admit or exclude aliens-is vested solely in the
Federal government.").
26. HAINEs & ROSENBLUM, supra note 4.
27. The United States Census Bureau provides statistics on immigrant
populations for the majority of America's cities. See http://factfinder.census.gov. In
Hazleton, 4.9% of the community reported themselves as Latino or Hispanic, while
94.7% reported themselves as white. See http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/
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Thus, it is all but inevitable that these local ordinances will
affect both documented and undocumented Latin-American immi-
grants on a disproportionate basis.
The ordinances discussed in this paper are merely a fraction
of those currently enacted or being considered by city councils and
state legislatures across the country.2" In addition, many of those
who support ordinances affecting immigrants' access to rental
housing do so with unparalleled zeal.29 Therefore, even though
many of the ordinances explained throughout this paper have
been struck down by courts or revised in an attempt to withstand
SAFFFacts?_event=ChangeGeoContext&geo id=16000US4233408&geoContext=&_
street& county=hazleton&_cityTown=Hazleton. In Riverside, 4.1% reported
themselves as Latino or Hispanic, while 90% reported themselves as white. See http:ll
factfinder.census.gov/servletlSAFFFacts?_event=Search&geo-id=16000US2975472&
_geoContext=O1000US%7CO4000US29%7C16000US2975472&_street=&_county=
riverside&_cityTown=riverside. In Escondido, 38.7% reported themselves as Latino
or Hispanic. See http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/SAFFFacts?_event=Search&geo-
id=06000US3400563510&_geoContext=01000US%7C04000US34%7C05000US34005
%7C06000US3400563510&_street=&_county=escondido&_cityTown=escondido. In
Farmers' Branch, 37.2% reported themselves as Latino or Hispanic. http://factfinder.
census.gov/servlet/SAFFFacts?_event=Search&geo-id=16000US0622804&_geo
Context=O1000US%7CO4000U06%7C16000US0622804&_street=& county=farmers+
ranch& cityTown=farmers+ranch. In Valley Park, 2.3% reported themselves as
Latino or Hispanic, while 90% reported themselves as white, while 89% reported
themselves as white. See http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/SAFFFacts?_event=
Search&geo-id=16000US4233408&_geoContext=O1000US%7C04000US42%7C1600
OUS4233408&_street=&_county=valley+park&_cityTown=valley+park. The number
of undocumented immigrants in these localities is difficult to discern because
undocumented immigrants do not report census information. As of 1994, the census
bureau has estimates by state of the amount of undocumented immigrants. Edward
W. Fernandez & J. Gregory Robinson, Illustrative Ranges of the Distribution of
Undocumented Immigrants by State, (Census Bureau Working Paper #8, 1994),
available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0008/table
01.txt. These estimates show that in California the undocumented immigrant
population is between 1.784 and 1.321 million. Id. In Pennsylvania the population is
estimated between 15,000 and 51,000. Id. New Jersey's estimated undocumented
immigrant population is estimated between 168,000 and 98,000. Id. Texas has an
estimated undocumented immigrant population between 427,000 and 300,000. Id.
Finally, Missouri's undocumented immigrant population is estimated to be between
13,000 and 3,000. Id.
28. http://www.fairimmigration.org/learn/immigration-reform-and-immigrants/
local-level/database-of-ordinances.html (listing local ordinances from 111 cities from
26 states and each laws status).
29. During a discussion regarding the use of local ordinances Walter Tejada, Vice
Chair of the Arlington County Board in Virginia stated that the Federal
Government's failure to reform immigration laws has unofficially given the "green
light" to "those who are hateful and who are angry" to manipulate local officials into
excluding people from their communities with the use of misinformation to indulge
their own xenophobia. Center for American Progress, Local Immigration Ordinances:
The result of Federal Inaction on Comprehensive Reform, available at http://
www.americanprogress.org/events/2007/08/immtranscript.pdf.
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judicial review, it is important to understand the arguments that
can be used to combat them. It seems that it is only a matter of
time before the next wave of ordinances will crash down on
America's cities. And while Judge Munley's decision in Lozano
struck down the offending ordinance that catalyzed several of the
other ordinances discussed in this paper, it did so primarily on the
grounds that federal law preempted the ordinance. Consequently,
it is still imperative to explore other possible violations that the
ordinances already enacted and those to come will manifest.
This paper will examine how local ordinances aimed at affect-
ing undocumented immigrants' ability to rent housing is at odds
with federal law and how the ordinances affect not only undocu-
mented immigrants, but also documented immigrants. Part II of
this paper will discuss the ordinances' affects on immigrants'
rights under the Fair Housing Act. Part III will explore how the
local ordinances affect immigrants' rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1981,
42 U.S.C. § 1982 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Part IV will examine how
the ordinances affect immigrants' Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Finally, this paper concludes that, regardless of the ordinances'
stated purposes, they conflict with the rights granted to docu-
mented and undocumented immigrants by the federal
government.
II. THE LOCAL ORDINANCES APPEAR TO AFFECT
IMMIGRANTS' RIGHTS UNDER THE FAIR
HOUSING ACT
Although the ordinances' stated goals are to prohibit the
rental of housing to undocumented immigrants, the laws also
appear to affect documented immigrants' ability to obtain hous-
ing.30 This occurs because the ordinances put landlords in the
respective localities in the untenable position of determining
whether a prospective tenant possesses the proper immigration
status to qualify them as someone who is not an "illegal alien"
under the ordinances.
3 1
Unless, as is very unlikely, a landlord has training in deter-
30. See HAZLETON, PA., Ordinance 2006-18 (2006); RIVERSIDE, N.J.,
Ordinance 2006-26 (2006); FARMERS BRANCH, TEX., Ordinance 2892 (2007);
VALLEY PARK, MO. Ordinance 1715 (2006); ESCONDIDO, CAL., Resolution 2007-
16 (2007).
31. All the laws mandate that landlords verify a suspected "illegal immigrants"
citizenship status by reviewing documents such as driver's licenses, green cards and
other paperwork regarding an individual's status in the United States before renting
to them or renewing a lease. See sources cited supra note 30.
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mining an individual's immigration status, it is difficult for them
to determine one's legal status under federal immigration laws
with any degree of accuracy.32 Thus, landlords are placed in a
position where they must either attempt to ascertain the legal sta-
tus of prospective tenants they believe might be an "illegal alien"
under the ordinances 33 and face draconian penalties if they are
wrong,34 or simply refuse to rent to anyone they believe to be an
"illegal alien" under the ordinances. This latter option might
also subject landlords to lawsuits under the Fair Housing Act
(,,FIA,,). 36
In addition, many of the ordinances seek to define "illegal
alien" by referencing the Immigration and Naturalization Act
("INA").37 Yet, the INA does not define "illegal alien." Further, it
is up to the federal government to determine whether an undocu-
mented immigrant will be removed from the United States, which
is determined through formal procedures laid out in the INA that
include judicial review.3 8 Additionally, Supreme Court Justices
32. Not only are landlords ill equipped to determine the authenticity of documents
produced by tenants and prospective tenants, but there are also several instances
where an individual is allowed to stay and work in the United States under federal
law and not provided with any documentation to show their legality in the country.
The Code of Federal Regulations lists several classes of aliens that do not have
documentation that would classify them as legal under the ordinances but will
nonetheless not be deported by the federal government. See 8 C.F.R. §274a. 12(c)
(2007). Among the categories listed are aliens who have submitted an application for
asylum, permanent residence and suspension of deportation proceedings. Id. For a
complete list see Id.
33. HAZLETON, PA., Ordinance 2006-18 (2006) (defines "illegal alien" as any
person who entered the United States through "illegal" means and "whose current
status is also illegal" or anyone who has overstayed their visa); RIVERSIDE, N.J.,
Ordinance 2006-26, §166-3(A)(4) (2006) (defines "illegal alien" by referring to federal
law and stating that officials will seek residency status from federal government
officials); FARMERS BRANCH, TEX., Ordinance 2892, §2(B)(1) (2007) (states that a
noncitizen under the ordinance is a person who is "neither a citizen nor national of the
United States"); VALLEY PARK, MO. Ordinance 1715, §2(d) (2006) (defines "illegal
alien" by referring to federal law and stating that officials will seek residency status
from federal government officials); also ESCONDIDO, CAL., Resolution 2007-16,
§1(1) (2007) (defines "illegal alien" by referring to federal law and stating that officials
will seek residency status from federal government officials).
34. The ordinances referenced at id impose fines ranging from $250 to $1,000 per
violation, with each day that a landlord rents to an individual deemed to be an "illegal
alien" constituting a new violation. See sources cited supra note 33.
35. Id.
36. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.
37. RIVERSIDE, N.J., Ordinance 2006-26, §166-3(A)(4) (2006); VALLEY PARK,
MO. Ordinance 1715, §2(d) (2006); ESCONDIDO, CAL., Resolution 2007-16, §1(1)
(2007).
38. See 8 C.F.R. § 240 (2008).
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have recognized the complexity inherent in the federal system
constructed to deal with immigration. 9
The FHA was enacted to combat housing discrimination
based on several protected classifications. 40 Race and national ori-
gin are among the characteristics protected under the FHA.41 The
FHA is based on the stated policy of providing "fair housing
throughout the United States."42 The law achieves this end by
prohibiting the refusal to rent housing or discriminating in the
terms, conditions or privileges thereof on the basis of, among other
things, race or national origin.43
The local ordinances place landlords in a position where they
must make decisions on whether to rent property to certain indi-
viduals based almost exclusively on race and national origin.
Landlords generally are not trained immigration authorities.
Consequently, they do not posses the skills or the resources to
determine the legal status of individuals they suspect as being an
"illegal alien" under the ordinances. Therefore, in order to avoid
the fines, landlords are forced to make judgments based on easily
ascertainable indicators of nationality. This will almost inevitably
lead to landlords denying rental properties to prospective clients
based on race and national origin.
Many of the ordinances also affect existing leases by subject-
ing extensions or renewals to confirmation of one's citizenship sta-
tus. 44 This again calls into focus the landlords' inability to
determine an individual's citizenship status under federal law.
Thus, landlords are in the same precarious position as discussed
above because the ordinances all but force them to make a deci-
sion on the terms, conditions and privileges of the tenants lease
based on far less than perfect information.45 As a result, race and
national origin are likely to be the factors landlords consider when
39. In Justice Blackmun's concurrence in Plyer he stated that it would be
impossible for a State to determine an immigrant's status under the federal
regulations. Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 236 (1982) (Blackmun concurring).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (a) (2008) (stating that it is unlawful to discriminate on the
basis or race, color, national origin, religion, sex or familial status).
41. Id.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2008).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) & (b) (2008).
44. RIVERSIDE, N.J., Ordinance No. 2006-26, §166-5(A)(1) (2006); FARMERS
BRANCH, TEX., Ordinance 2892, §2(B)(2) (2007); ESCONDIDO, CAL., Resolution
2007-16, §16E-l(a) (2007).
45. 42 U.S.C. 3604(b) (2008), prohibits discrimination in regards to the terms,
conditions or privileges of a lease.
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determining whether to extend or renew the lease of one they sus-
pect may be an "illegal alien."
It is also a violation of the FHA to "make, print, or publish, or
cause to be made, printed, or published any notice, statement, or
advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that
indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national ori-
gin... "46 In this instance, the ordinances are essentially a notice
that those of Latin-American origin will be discriminated against
when attempting to obtain housing. Even though the laws are
facially neutral regarding documented immigrants and natural
citizens, they will inevitably affect immigrants from Latin Ameri-
can countries on a disproportionate basis due to the percentage of
Latin immigrants generally in the United States47 and specifically
in the localities where the ordinances were enacted.48
Further, the FHA makes it unlawful to "coerce, intimidate,
threaten or interfere with any person" in the enjoyment of their
rights granted by section 3604 of the FHA or anyone who "aided or
encouraged any other person" to exercise or enjoy such rights.4 9
The ordinances seem to coerce, intimidate, threaten and interfere
with Latin immigrants' right to rent property free of invidious dis-
crimination."° This is accomplished by making it known to Latin
immigrants that they will likely be subjected to stringent checks
into personal information before being able to rent housing 1 and
possibly being denied rental property by a landlord based on their
race and/or national origin.
The ordinances seem to carry with them an implicit threat
that all immigrants will be treated unfairly and are not welcome
in the cities that have passed such laws. The ordinances' vague-
ness in describing what constitutes an "illegal alien"52 and their
46. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2008).
47. See HAINEs & ROSENBLUM, supra note 4 (discussing percentage of immigrants
in the United States from Latin American countries).
48. Census Bureau, supra note 27.
49. 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (2008).
50. Nevels v. Western World Ins. Co., Inc., 359 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (W.D. Wash.
2004) (holding FHA proscribes all practices that interfere with exercise of rights
under the FHA).
51. All the ordinances mandate a check into the residency status of a prospective
tenant whom the landlord believes to be an "illegal alien." See HAZLETON, PA.,
2006-18 (2006); see also RIVERSIDE, N.J., Ordinance 2006-26 (2006); FARMERS
BRANCH, TEX., Ordinance 2892 (2007); VALLEY PARK, MO. Ordinance 1715
(2006); ESCONDIDO, CAL., Resolution 2007-16 (2007).
52. HAZLETON, PA., Ordinance 2006-18 (2006) (defines "illegal alien" as any
person who entered the United States through "illegal" means and "whose current
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stated purposes53 bolster the threatening nature of the laws
because they allow for almost unfettered discretion in their
enforcement.
The FHA allows a state or other locality to regulate its hous-
ing industry.54 There is, however, one caveat. Any'law that would
require or permit discriminatory housing practices is invalid
under the FHA.55 Therefore, because the ordinances will almost
inevitably put pressure on landlords to use race and national ori-
gin as characteristics to screen out and potentially deny immi-
grants housing, it seems that the laws violate the FHA by
permitting landlords to use such characteristics to carry out dis-
criminatory housing practices.
Consequently, anyone aggrieved by the ordinances, and any
future ordinances that will be passed, should have access to
injunctive relief to put an end to the discriminatory acts.56 How-
ever, just because the ordinances seem to provide a vehicle with
which landlords might act discriminately toward prospective
tenants based on race and/or national origin, does not mean that
the localities intended such a consequence. Nevertheless, if
aggrieved plaintiffs can show that the ordinances permit such dis-
criminatory housing practices they could attack them on such
grounds.
The FHA borrows its litigation framework from the employ-
ment discrimination arena. 7 Thus, claims under the FHA operate
status is also illegal" or anyone who has overstayed their visa); RIVERSIDE, N.J.,
Ordinance 2006-26, §166-3(A)(4) (2006); (defines "illegal alien" by referring to federal
law and stating that officials will seek residency status from federal government
officials); FARMERS BRANCH, TEX., Ordinance 2892, §2(B)(1) (2007) (states that a
noncitizen under the ordinance is a person who is "neither a citizen nor national of the
United States"); VALLEY PARK, MO. Ordinance 1715, §2(d) (2006) (defines "illegal
alien" by referring to federal law and stating that officials will seek residency status
from federal government officials); ESCONDIDO, CAL., Resolution 2007-16, §1(1)
(2007) (defines "illegal alien" by referring to federal law and stating that officials will
seek residency status from federal government officials).
53. The ordinances stated purposes are to protect the health, safety and general
welfare of the citizenry by eliminating the ills that follow "illegal aliens," such as
falling property values, increased crime and sub par school systems. HAZLETON,
PA., Ordinance 2006-18, §2(c) (2006); RIVERSIDE, N.J., Ordinance 2006-26, §166-2
(2006); FARMERS BRANCH, TEX., Ordinance 2892 (2007); VALLEY PARK, MO.
Ordinance 1736, §2(c) & (d) (2006); ESCONDIDO, CAL., Ordinance 2006-38, §1(5)
(2006).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 3615 (2008).
55. Id.
56. 42 U.S.C. 3614(d)(1)(a) (2008), grants court the power to enter injunctive relief
for violations of the FHA.
57. Larkin v. State of Mich. Dept. of Soc. Serv., 89 F. 3d 285, 289 (6th Cir. 1996)
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in two fashions." First, an individual plaintiff or group of plain-
tiffs can claim intentional discrimination and proceed under the
McDonnell Douglas/Burdine framework, which is a burden shift-
ing paradigm that raises a rebuttable presumption of discrimina-
tion when a plaintiff presents a prima facie case. 9 A group or
class of plaintiffs could also state a claim where there is a law that
facially discriminates against them.6 ° Second, a group or class of
plaintiffs can attack a facially neutral law on the basis that it has
a disparate impact on the group or class.61
In this instance, the ordinances will almost certainly have a
disparate impact on both undocumented and documented immi-
grants in the respective localities. Consequently, aggrieved
immigrants could attack the laws under the disparate impact the-
ory.63 Aggrieved parties can achieve this by using statistics to
show that a particular practice had a disproportionate affect on
Latin immigrants.' Here, this could be demonstrated by showing
that the percentage of qualified Latin immigrants who were
denied rental properties or had their lease renewal refused is sig-
nificantly larger than that of natural citizens or groups from other
national origins.
Once disparate impact is shown, the burden would then shift
to the defendant, in this case the localities or perhaps an offending
landlord, to produce a "legitimate non-discriminatory reason for
the action and that no less discriminatory alternatives were avail-
able."65 It seems likely that where the locality was defending such
an action it would proffer increased crime, overcrowded schools
and lowered property values as its legitimate, non-discriminatory
(stating that courts have analogized Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., which prohibits employment discrimination, with the FHA






62. To state a claim of disparate impact the plaintiff must show that a particular
practice or policy disproportionately affects a protected class. 2922 Sherman Ave.
Tenants' Ass'n v. District of Columbia, 444 F. 3d 673, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
63. Id.
64. For examples of FHA plaintiffs using statistics to show disparate impact see
Allen v. Seidman, 881 F. 2d 375 (7th Cir. 1989) and Huntington Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v.
Town of Huntington, 844 F. 2d 926 (2nd Cir. 1988).
65. Dr. Gertrude A. Barber Center, Inc. v. Peters Tp., 273 F.Supp.2d 643, 654
(W.D. Pa. 2003).
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reason for the ordinance. This certainly seems to meet the criteria
stated for the burden.
However, because the localities did not rely on evidence to
support their conclusions regarding these alleged justifications, it
is difficult to discern just how much weight such assertions will
garner. In addition, it may be difficult for a locality to demon-
strate that no less discriminatory alternatives existed to the ordi-
nances. For instance, all the alleged ills may be the result of the
natural occurrence of population growth, and as a result alterna-
tive policing tactics such as generally increased patrols or target-
ing areas where the increased crime is alleged to take place may
be more effective and less discriminatory then the ordinances.
Increasing funding to schools or municipal projects aimed at
increasing property values may also be effective at eliminating the
other complaints claimed to be the result of undocumented immi-
grants and would also be less likely to have a discriminatory
impact. Ultimately it is difficult to know, what practices will be
effective at eliminating the alleged ills with the least amount of
discriminatory impact without first knowing what definitively
causes the problems.
It appears the local ordinances, that the localities claim they
enacted to quell rampant undocumented immigration and the ills
purported to follow it, are offensive to the FHA. Of course, there
are at least two sides to every story. The plaintiffs in the respec-
tive localities acted quickly and obtained temporary restraining
orders66 or the ordinances have been repealed 67 before they could
be enforced. Thus, much of the argument regarding the affects of
the ordinances is speculative.
This calls into question the plaintiffs' standing to challenge
the ordinances under the FHA. But, standing under the FHA has
66. Valley Park Temporary Restraining Order, Cause No. 06-CC-3802 (granting
plaintiffs' motion for temporary restraining order); Escondido Temporary Restraining
Order, Case No. 3:06-cv-02434-JAH-NLS (granting plaintiffs' motion for temporary
restraining order); Farmers Branch Memorandum Opinion and Order Granting
Temporary Restraining Order, Case No. 3:06-cv-02371 (granting plaintiffs' motion for
temporary restraining order); Hazleton Temporary Restraining Order, Case No. 3:06-
cv-01586-JMM (granting plaintiffs' motion for temporary restraining order).
67. The Riverside, N.J., City Council voted to repeal the ordinance on Sep. 17,
2007 and in July 2007, Valley Park, Missouri, repealed its ordinance. Ken Belson &
Jill P. Capuzzo, Town Rethinks Law Against Illegal Immigrants, N.Y. TIMEs, Sep. 26,
2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/26/nyregion/26riverside.html?-r=
1&hp&oref=slogin. Some speculate that the exodus of hundreds or possibly
thousands of immigrants who had migrated to the United States from Latin-
American Countries may have motivated the repeals. Id.
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been defined broadly as containing no more than Article III of the
Constitution requires."8 In addition, the Supreme Court has ruled
that courts should construe standing liberally under the FHA. 9
Thus, although it is true that injury in this instance is somewhat
speculative, it certainly appears imminent, due to the fact that if
the ordinances are enforced they will place landlords in the posi-
tion discussed above. As a result, landlords will be left with a
Hobson's choice, where they are faced with attempting to abide by
the law and risk liability by accidentally or purposefully discrimi-
nating against Latin immigrants or they can choose not to enforce
the law and subject themselves to fines from the locality. Either
way, the ordinances impose liability on landlords whether or not
they choose to act according to the ordinances' demands. Further,
numerous courts have found that plaintiffs had standing to chal-
lenge the ordinances based on the likelihood that the laws violated
rights guaranteed by the Constitution and the Federal
Government. 0
Based on the above analysis, it seems likely that immigrants
from Latin-American countries have reason to fear that, if
enforced, the ordinances will cause them to suffer injury. The
injury would be in the form of limiting their housing options on a
disproportionate basis due to their race and/or national origin as a
direct result of the ordinances' mandates. Therefore, the ordi-
nances, even before one is enforced, seem quite likely to violate
the FHA.
As discussed above, it appears that any ordinance causing
landlords to evict tenants deemed to be "illegal aliens" or placing
68. Compare Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins., Co., 409 U.S. 205, 207 (1972)
(stating that all the FHA requires to file a complaint is injury by a discriminatory
housing practice or the belief that they will be injured by a discriminatory housing
practice that is imminent) with Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61
(1992) (holding that Article III of the Constitution requires concrete and
particularized injury to a legally protected right which is actual or imminent, causal
connection between injury and defendant's action and the likelihood that injury will
be redressed by favorable decision).
69. Trafficante, 209 U.S. at 212 (holding that the FHA's standing requirement can
only be given "vitality" through a "generous construction").
70. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 498 (2007); see also Valley
Park, Mo., Temporary Restraining Order, Cause No. 06-CC-3802 (granting plaintiffs'
motion for temporary restraining order); Escondido, Cal., Temporary Restraining
Order, Case No. 3:06-cv-02434-JAH-NLS (granting plaintiffs' motion for temporary
restraining order); Farmers Branch, Tex., Memorandum Opinion and Order Granting
Temporary Restraining Order, Case No. 3:06-cv-02371 (granting plaintiffs' motion for
temporary restraining order); Hazleton Pa., Temporary Restraining Order, Case No.
3:06-cv-01586-JMM (granting plaintiffs' motion for temporary restraining order).
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landlords in a position where they must discriminate on the basis
of race or national origin violate the FHA. However, documented
immigrants were the subjects of the above analysis, whereas the
discussion to follow will revolve around undocumented
immigrants.
The first hurdle to cross in this analysis is the issue of stand-
ing, which begs the question whether the FHA provides protection
to undocumented immigrants as it appears to for documented
immigrants. The City of Hazleton argued that undocumented
immigrants could not have standing to sue under any law because
they entered the country illegally and thus were not afforded the
protections provided by American laws.71
The FHA employs the language "any person" to describe those
afforded protection under the statute.72 This suggests that Con-
gress intended the protections of the FHA to apply to anyone pre-
sent in the United States, regardless of their citizenship status.
Additional fodder for this position is found in the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, which also
employs the language of "any person" when describing those
afforded due process and equal protection rights.73 This language
has been interpreted to mean that all persons present in the
United States, regardless of how they entered the country, are
afforded protections under federal law." Further, if undocu-
mented immigrants are provided the same protection under the
laws as documented immigrants, the ordinances would have the
same affect on undocumented immigrants as it does on docu-
mented immigrants.
Judge Munley found that the Hazleton ordinance did not vio-
late the FHA.75 His decision was based on the fact that Hazleton
changed the language dealing with what constituted a valid com-
71. Lozano, 496 U.S. at 500-01.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2008) (proscribing discrimination of "any person" in the
rental of housing or the terms, privileges or conditions of rental housing to).
73. U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1 (stating "nor shall any state deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws").
74. "Whatever his status under the immigration laws, an alien is surely a 'person'
in any ordinary sense of that term." Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982). Aliens,
even aliens whose presence in this country is unlawful, have long been recognized as
"persons" guaranteed due process of law by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments."
Id. The Plyer Court went on to state that the protections afforded by both the Due
Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment were
identical, and thus extended to all persons, regardless of their legal status in the
country and regardless if they violated federal law to enter the country. Id. at 211-12.
75. Lozano, 469 F. Supp. 2d at 545-46.
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plaint to exclude complaints based in any part on race or national
origin, and consequently the law did not facially violate the FHA.76
Further, because the ordinance had not been applied, Judge
Munley found that arguments as to its affect under the FHA were
too speculative to be given weight.77
III. How LOCAL ORDINANCES AFFECT IMMIGRANTS' RIGHTS
UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 & 42
U.S.C. § 1983
A. 42 U.S.C. § 1981
While the FHA seems to be the most applicable federal stat-
ute, the ordinances also appear to be in conflict with other federal
legislation. For instance, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ("§ 1981") states that
"All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have
the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce
contracts ... and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and pro-
ceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by
white citizens . . . " The Supreme Court has interpreted the lan-
guage of § 1981 to mean that the privileges afforded white citizens
at the time the statute was enacted were the high-watermark of
legal protections given contracts and that Congress intended to
give the full plethora of contractual rights and obligations to all
those persons within the United States.78
The statute further states "The rights protected by this sec-
tion are protected against impairment by nongovernmental dis-
crimination and impairment under color of State law."79 This
passage has been interpreted to protect against discrimination
based on race and alienage, and therefore applies directly to docu-
mented immigrants and their right to contract free from discrimi-
nation based on their immigration status. °
The ordinances appear to conflict with § 1981 by limiting doc-
umented immigrants' right to contract freely for rental property.
This is accomplished through similar means as those discussed
above. More specifically, the ordinances affect the Mexican and
Latin-American immigrant populations by all but forcing land-
lords to discriminate against those they suspect of being undocu-
76. Id. at 546.
77. Id.
78. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 282 (1976).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2008).
80. Takashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948).
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mented immigrants in an attempt to avoid liability under the
ordinances. If such discrimination takes place it seems quite
likely that it violate § 1981 because it will limit documented immi-
grants' rights to make and enforce contracts by placing landlords
in a position where they will discriminatorily choose to not enter
leases with individuals they suspect of being undocumented. Con-
sequently, documented immigrants will be stripped of their right
to contract for rental property in cities that enact such legislation.
Unlike the discussion above regarding claims under the FHA,
there are no disparate impact claims under § 1981.1 The discrim-
ination complained of must be intentional. 2 Such intent may be
inferred from the totality of the circumstances due to the fact that
those making the policies do not generally announce their intent
to discriminate. Therefore, a successful claim under § 1981 must
allege and show that the localities acted intentionally to discrimi-
nate against Latin-American immigrants on the basis of their race
or alienage. In attacking the ordinances, the fact that the laws
have a disparate impact on immigrants from Latin-American
countries, may be used as evidence of the localities intent to dis-
criminate against their right to contract.84 A successful claim may
also be made against landlords by showing that they intentionally
discriminated against a documented immigrant on the basis of
race or alienage.8 5
By its own terms § 1981, extends the protections it affords
under the language "make and enforce contracts" to all privileges
inherent in a contractual relationship.8 This protection almost
81. Disparate impact claims are utilized to combat facially neutral policies, while
42 U.S.C. § 1981 grants a remedy for acts of intentional racial discrimination.
Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 580 F. Supp. 1114, 1121 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (holding intent
is necessary element of a § 1981 claim because the rights afforded therein do not cover
facially neutral policies that when enforced fall more harshly on one race).
82. To state a prima facie claim of discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, a
plaintiff must allege and show that the discrimination was intentional. General
Building Contractors Assn. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982); Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 88 (1968) (stating that 42 U.S.C. § 1981, grants a remedy for
intentional acts of racial discrimination that impedes one's ability to make and
enforce contracts).
83. Blair v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 609 F. Supp. 276, 279 (E.D. Pa.
1985).
84. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 266 (1977).
85. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 282 (1976).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) (2008) states "[i]or purposes of this section, the term 'make
and enforce contracts' includes the making, performance, modification, and
termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and
conditions of the contractual relationship."
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certainly reaches a tenants option to extend their lease for an
additional period. Thus, not only do the ordinances under exami-
nation here appear to unlawfully affect documented immigrants'
rights to enter contracts for rental property, they also likely inter-
fere with documented immigrants' privileges of exercising the
extension options in already existing contracts. Although, the
Farmers Branch, Texas, ordinance explicitly applies to lease
extension, and thus is subject to a facial challenge,87 the other
ordinances do not explicitly address the issue, and as a result
would only be subject to challenges claiming the ordinances were
unlawful as applied."
The City of Hazleton argued that § 1981 did not apply to
undocumented immigrants because they were not persons under
the law. Judge Munley disagreed, stating:
"The Supreme Court, however, has not yet addressed
whether the protections of section 1981 extend to undocu-
mented aliens, i.e. whether an undocumented alien is a
"person" under section 1981. The Court has, in the context
of the Fourteenth Amendment, held that '[wihatever his
status under the immigration laws, an alien is surely a
'person' in any ordinary sense of that term. Aliens, even
aliens whose presence in this country is unlawful, have
long been recognized as 'persons' guaranteed due process of
law by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.' (citation
omitted). This reasoning applies equally to a section 1981
analysis as to the Fourteenth Amendment analysis, espe-
cially because the language used in section 1981 is based in
part on the language of the Fourteenth Amendment. (cita-
tion omitted). Accordingly, we find that aliens, regardless of
their status under the immigration laws, are persons under
section 1981.""9
B. 42 U.S.C. § 1982
The ordinances may also violate 42 U.S.C. § 1982. Section
1982 states that "All citizens of the United States shall have the
same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white
citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey
real and personal property." Based on § 1982, immigrants from
87. FARMERS BRANCH, TEX., Ordinance 2892, § 2(B)(4)(i) (2007).
88. See RIVERSIDE, N.J., Ordinance 2006-26 (2006); see also HAZLETON, PA.,
2006-18 (2006); see also VALLEY PARK, MO. Ordinance 1715 (2006); ESCONDIDO,
CAL., Resolution 2007-16 (2007).
89. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F.Supp.2d 477, 547 (M.D. Pa. 2007).
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Mexico and Latin-American countries who have attained citizen-
ship through the proper channels are given the gamut of rights
afforded any other citizen of the United States when it comes to
real property. On its face the statute addresses the right to
purchase or lease real property. ° Consequently, due to the ordi-
nances proscription against landlords renting to "illegal aliens"
and the discriminatory decisions that are likely to follow, there is
a distinct possibility that the ordinances as applied will violate
§ 1982.
C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Those affected by the ordinance may also have a claim under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("§ 1983"). A § 1983 claim has two prerequisites.
First, there must be a deprivation of a constitutional or federal
rights. 1 Second, someone acting under the color of state law must
have perpetrated that deprivation.92 As demonstrated above, and
will continue to be demonstrated below, it seems clear that the
ordinances under examination here infringe upon several consti-
tutional and federal rights. In addition, there can be no question
but that the ordinances are enacted and enforced by the respective
localities acting under the color of state law. Therefore, any one
affected by the ordinances unconstitutional and federally repug-
nant mandates will be able to state a claim under § 1983.
IV. LOCAL ORDINANCES APPEAR TO AFFECT IMMIGRANTS'
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS
AND EQUAL PROTECTION
A. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
It also appears that the ordinances do not afford adequate due
process to those deemed to be in violation of the laws. In fact,
Judge Munley found that the Hazleton ordinance violated tenants'
due process rights by failing to provide adequate notice or hear-
ing.93 The Supreme Court has expended a significant amount of
90. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2008).
91. "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress". 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2008).
92. Id.
93. Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 538.
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ink developing America's due process jurisprudence.94 From these
opinions it can be gleaned that an individual must be afforded
both notice and hearing before a deprivation of property will be
considered constitutional.95
Where due process rights attach to property, courts look to
three factors to determine whether the appropriate level of due
process was afforded an individual being deprived of property.96
First, the courts examine the interest affected by the action. 97 In
this instance, documented and undocumented immigrants, as well
as United States citizens, are subject to eviction from their homes,
lest their landlords suffer fines for every day they continue to rent
to those individuals deemed to be "illegal."
Additionally, the ordinances do not require the localities to
sustain any burden of proof that an individual fits the classifica-
tion of "illegal alien" before the deprivation takes place. If an indi-
vidual does not provide the appropriate documentation there is a
distinct possibility that the locality might deem that individual an
"illegal alien," and thus any landlord renting to such an individual
would be subject to penalties. For instance, to legally rent hous-
ing under the Farmers Branch ordinance "Each family member,
regardless of age, must submit the following evidence to the owner
and/or property manager," U.S. citizens must submit evidence
consisting of a "signed declaration of U.S. citizenship" which "shall
be confirmed by requiring presentation of a United States pass-
port or other appropriate documentation . . . as acceptable evi-
dence of citizenship status."9" For noncitizens, "the evidence
consists of: a. a signed declaration of eligible immigration status;
b. a form designated by the Immigration and Customs Enforce-
ment Department ... as acceptable evidence of immigration sta-
tus; and c. a signed verification consent form."99 If an individual
does not provide the documentation called for in their respective
classification then a landlord has to either turn them away or rent
to them and face the possibility of stiff penalties if the locality
94. Examples of Supreme Court cases dealing with due process include, Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), Fuentes
v. Shevin. 407 U.S. 67 (1972), Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982)
and Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), among numerous others.
95. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 97 (holding that notice and hearing that is calculated to
establish the validity of the underlying claims must be given before deprivation of
property will be considered constitutional, except in extraordinary circumstances).
96. Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335.
97. Id.
98. FARMERS BRANCH, TEX., Ordinance 2892, § 2(f)(3)(i) (2007).
99. FARMERS BRANCH, TEX., Ordinance 2892, § 2(f)(3)(ii) (2007).
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deems the individual to be an "illegal alien."'
The second prong of the three-part analysis requires the
courts to examine the risk of wrongful deprivation posed by the
procedures employed and the benefit of additional or different pro-
cedures.101 It appears that, if enforced, the ordinances will almost
certainly result in the wrongful deprivation of property from those
deemed "illegal aliens." As discussed above, the definitions used
to determine an individual's status under the ordinances make it
difficult to discern who classifies as an "illegal alien" under the
ordinances. Moreover, the conclusory nature of the procedures
used in the ordinances result in deprivation of property before the
individual who is being deprived of property is allowed to chal-
lenge the action because they do not call for any form of pre-depri-
vation hearing.102
The effectiveness of additional or substitute safeguards is
questionable. The localities could more accurately define an indi-
vidual who would be considered an "illegal alien" in terms that
landlords could easily understand. Or, the cities could provide
immigration training to every landlord in the area that would aid
them in determining which prospective tenants would violate the
ordinance. Nevertheless, these options are probably not finan-
cially feasible for the localities that enacted the ordinances.
Another option is to allow for a hearing before the deprivation
takes place. This option seems the most likely to survive a due
process challenge because due process generally calls for notice
and hearing before the deprivation takes place. 10 3
The third prong analyzed under this framework is the govern-
ment's interest, which includes financial concerns and administra-
tive difficulties, that may follow from any substitute or additional
procedures implemented to safeguard wrongful deprivation. 0 In
this instance, the localities' interests, as stated in the ordinances
themselves, are to eradicate the evils perceived to follow undocu-
mented immigrants.0 5 Yet, the ordinances fail to provide informa-
100. FARMERS BRANCH, TEX., Ordinance 2892, § 4 (2007).
101. Id.
102. See HAZLETON, PA., 2006-18 (2006); see also RIVERSIDE, N.J., Ordinance
2006-26 (2006); FARMERS BRANCH, TEX., Ordinance 2892 (2007); VALLEY PARK,
MO. Ordinance 1715 (2006); ESCONDIDO, CAL., Resolution 2007-16 (2007).
103. Logan, 455 U.S. at 436 (holding that post-deprivation hearing is inadequate to
satisfy the constitutional requirement of due process unless there is a specific need for
fast action, especially when the only hearing allowed is an independent action after
the deprivation).
104. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
105. HAZLETON, PA., Ordinance 2006-18, §2(c) (2006); RIVERSIDE, N.J.,
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tion supporting the conclusion that the presence of undocumented
immigrants results in increased crime, diminished property val-
ues or overburdened schools. In fact, Mr. Barletta, Hazleton's
mayor, admitted that he had no statistics to support the assertion
that undocumented immigrants played a role in the city's alleged
escalation in crime, nor did he have any idea as to how may
undocumented immigrants were in the city. 10 6 Further, statistics
show a general decline in Hazleton's crime rate. 107 As a result, it
seems that the localities' interests are not adequate, or at least not
adequately supported to override an individual's due process
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Nonetheless, the financial and administrative costs of provid-
ing pre-deprivation hearings are not likely to override the neces-
sity of providing such a safeguard before depriving one of their
home. The courts, however, have consistently held that post-dep-
rivation hearings are inadequate to satisfy the Fourteenth
Amendment's requirement of due process unless there is an exi-
gent circumstance that results in the impracticability of providing
a pre-deprivation hearing.' 8
B. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
The ordinances also appear to be in violation of immigrants
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights.0 9 The potential
violation imposed by the ordinances stems from the fact that they
affect similarly situated individuals differently. The ordinances'
affects would almost inevitably fall harder on those suspected of
being undocumented immigrants than those who are not. Land-
lords' suspicions regarding an individual's citizenship status is
likely to be based on characteristics such as skin color, accent,
Ordinance 2006-26, §166-2 (2006); FARMERS BRANCH, TEX., Ordinance 2892
(2007); VALLEY PARK, MO. Ordinance 1736, §2(c) & (d) (2006); ESCONDIDO, CAL.,
Ordinance 2006-38, §1(5) (2006).
106. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 459 F.Supp.2d 332, 336 (M.D. Pa. 2006), citing Dan
Geringer, Bloomberg: U.S. Can't Stem Immigration Tide, PHILADELPHIA DAILY NEWS,
July 6, 2006 at 7.
107. Ellen Barry, City Vents Anger at Illegal Immigrants, L.A. TIMES, July 14, 2006,
at Al. ("Statistics compiled by the Pennsylvania State Police Uniform Crime
Reporting System show a reduction in the number of total arrests in Hazleton over
the last five years, from 1,458 in 2000 to 1,263 in 2005. Whereas the number of thefts
and drug related crimes has risen from a low point of 80 in 2001 to 127 in 2005, the
total number of reported rapes, robberies, homicides and assaults has decreased since
2000.").
108. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 436 (1982).
109. "Nor shall any state deprive any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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dress or a number of other innocuous traits that are associated
with one's race or national origin.
As a result of the ordinances' mandates against renting to
those the respective localities deem "illegal aliens," landlords are
placed in the uncomfortable position of making decisions about a
potential tenant's status under the laws based on superficial
traits. Thus, because the majority of America's recent immigrants
originated from Latin-American countries,11 ° the ordinances will
naturally affect them at a disproportionate rate.
Nevertheless, almost all laws affect a group on a dispropor-
tionate basis. This does not necessarily mean that every law that
does so is a violation of the equal protection clause. If, however, a
law is facially discriminatory against a suspect class, such as race
or national origin, it is subject to stringent judicial review known
as strict scrutiny.' The ordinances at issue here are facially dis-
criminatory against "illegal aliens," but this is not a classification
that warrants strict scrutiny review on its face.
However, when a law that is facially neutral regarding a sus-
pect classification for strict scrutiny purposes, but strict scrutiny
does apply to a facially neutral law when it can be shown that it
was motivated by a "racial purpose or object" or is "unexplainable
on grounds other than race. The Supreme Court has stated, "no
plausible distinction with respect to Fourteenth Amendment
'jurisdiction' can be drawn between resident aliens whose entry
into the United States was lawful, and resident aliens whose
entry was unlawful."" 3 Therefore, undocumented immigrants are
afforded the full panoply of Fourteenth Amendment protections,
and any law that is accused of violating an undocumented immi-
grant's equal protection rights on the basis of their race and/or
national origin is subject to review under strict scrutiny.
Therefore, in order to warrant strict scrutiny review of the
ordinances the plaintiffs must show that either the drafters were
110. See Camarota, supra note 4.
111. Legislative classifications based on race violate the equal protection guarantee
of the Fourteenth Amendment unless the government can demonstrate a compelling
interest and show that the law is narrowly tailored to reach the desired end. Cuffeld
v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 936 F.Supp. 266, 280 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980) ("Presumption of constitutional validity, however,
disappears if a statutory classification is predicated on criteria that are, in a
constitutional sense, 'suspect,' the principal example of which is a classification based
on race."). Classifications based on a suspect class are "presumptively invidious."
Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982).
112. Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 545 (1999).
113. Plyer, 457 U.S. at 211 n.10.
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motivated by race and/or national origin, or that there is no other
plausible explanation for the ordinances than such prejudice.
This analysis requires inquiry into any direct or circumstantial
evidence that is available regarding the lawmakers' intent in
drafting the ordinances and was the "predominant factor motivat-
ing" their drafting of the ordinances.114 This certainly is a difficult
burden to bear in order to obtain strict scrutiny review. There is,
however, evidence to support an assertion that the ordinances'
drafters were motivated by race and/or national origin when cre-
ating the laws. As discussed throughout this paper, the ordi-
nances' drafters in the respective localities did not rely on any
evidence to support their assertions that undocumented immi-
grants caused any of the problems that allegedly prompted the
laws. Further, in the Hazleton case there is evidence to refute at
least one of the alleged reasons proffered for the ordinances. 115
However, it is unclear whether this lack of evidence, and at least
in one case presence of contrary evidence, is enough to warrant
application of strict scrutiny.
In the event that strict scrutiny does apply based on the fore-
going analysis, it consists of a two-part inquiry. First, the govern-
ment enacting the law must show that the law serves a compelling
government interest.116 In this instance, the localities have stated
what would appear to be a compelling interest: 7 the eradication
of crime, fixing failing schools and restoring property values,
among other things."" Assuming that such goals are adequate to
satisfy the compelling justification standard, there is no evidence
given by the localities to support that undocumented immigrants
114. Hunt, 526 U.S. at 545.
115. Barry, supra note 107.
116. Plyer, 457 U.S. at 217.
117. It is difficult to determine what interests are sufficient to meet the compelling
interest standard because the Supreme Court has not given a clear definition to the
term. The jurisprudence in the area appears to be little more than an "unstructured
balancing test." Jed Rubenfeld, On the Legal Status of the Proposition that "Life
Begins at Conception", 43 STAN. L. REV. 599, 603-04 (1991). Professor Lino Graglia
stated that "compelling, even more than beauty, [may be] in the eyes of the beholder."
David Schimmel, Is Bakke Still Good Law? The Fifth Circuit Says No and Outlaws
Affirmative Action Admissions, 113 ED. LAW REP. 1052, 1064 (1996) (citing Lino
Graglia, Texas Lawyer, Sep. 25, 1995, p. 25). For an analysis of Supreme Court cases
applying strict scrutiny and the compelling justification standard see Adam Winkler,
Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the
Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L.REv. 793 (2006).
118. HAZLETON, PA., Ordinance 2006-18, §2(c) (2006); RIVERSIDE, N.J.,
Ordinance 2006-26, §166-2 (2006); FARMERS BRANCH, TEX., Ordinance 2892
(2007); VALLEY PARK, MO. Ordinance 1736, §2(c) & (d) (2006); ESCONDIDO, CAL.,
Ordinance 2006-38, §1(5) (2006).
552
2008] IMMIGRANTS' ACCESS TO HOUSING
have any part in creating these ills. Thus, there is no evidence
that the ordinances, if effective in eliminating undocumented
immigrants from the cities, will cure the problems.
The second-prong requires that the law must be narrowly tai-
lored to achieve the desired end.119 As demonstrated throughout
this paper, if the laws are enforced they will almost certainly have
an effect on immigrants and citizens originating from Latin-Amer-
ican countries. Therefore, the laws appear to be over-inclusive,
and as a result they seem to fail this prong because over-inclusive-
ness suggests that the ordinances are not narrowly tailored.
In addition, this aspect of the ordinances is questionable
because there is no evidence to support the claim that undocu-
mented immigrants cause the evils the localities seek to eradicate.
Consequently, there is no way to definitively know if the ordi-
nances are narrowly tailored to accomplish the stated goals unless
it is first shown that the traits combated are the cause of the
problems. Assuming that undocumented immigrants are the
cause of the problems the laws are aimed at eradicating, denying
such individuals housing and employment may well be the least
restrictive way to go about it. But, that does not save the ordi-
nances from failing the first prong.
The ordinances, if enforced, will also likely affect documented
immigrants and American citizens originating from Latin-Ameri-
can countries on a disproportionate basis to white immigrants or
citizens. In this instance, it is incumbent on the plaintiffs to show
discriminatory intent on the part of the lawmakers. 1' 0 Intent can
be inferred from the "totality of the relevant facts." 2 '
Although intent is generally a difficult aspect to show, there
is evidence that the ordinances were drafted with discriminatory
intent. For example, the lawmakers stated that their purpose in
drafting the ordinances was to eliminate crime, diminished prop-
erty values and failing schools,12 ' which may ultimately be the
result of population growth nationally and in the respective locali-
ties and have nothing to do with the immigration status of the
citizenry. They attempted to achieve this by ousting "illegal
aliens." From this it can be inferred that the lawmakers viewed
119. Plyer, 457 U.S. at 217.
120. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240-41 (1976).
121. Id.
122. HAZLETON, PA., Ordinance 2006-18, §2(c) (2006); RIVERSIDE, N.J.,
Ordinance 2006-26, §166-2 (2006); FARMERS BRANCH, TEX., Ordinance 2892
(2007); VALLEY PARK, MO. Ordinance 1736, §2(c) & (d) (2006); ESCONDIDO, CAL.,
Ordinance 2006-38, §1(5) (2006).
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immigrants - who are overwhelmingly from Mexico and Latin-
American countries - as criminals who do not care for their prop-
erty and do not value education. In fact, those are almost the
exact words used by one of the advocates for the Farmers Branch,
Texas, ordinance.
12 3
However, if intent to discriminate based on race or national
origin cannot be shown on the part of the lawmakers, then the law
would be reviewed under the far more deferential rational basis
test.1 24 This would include simply determining if the lawmakers
had a legitimate reason for enacting the ordinances and whether
the means by which they went about it were appropriate to meet
the legitimate end.
1 25
In these instances it does appear that fighting crime, increas-
ing property values and mending a broken education system are
legitimate ends that lawmakers could address through the ordi-
nances. Further, if there were evidence that undocumented immi-
grants were responsible for the reported ills then it would seem
that the ordinances would be an adequately tailored response to
address the problems. But, therein lies the problem. The
lawmakers did not rely on any evidence that undocumented immi-
grants were responsible for increased crime or failing schools. It
seems that they acted on impulse alone. Nevertheless, Judge
Munley found that strict scrutiny was inapplicable because there
was no evidence of intent to discriminate because of race and/or
national origin
V. CONCLUSION
The ordinances enacted in cities like Hazleton, Farmers
Branch, Riverside, Valley Park and Escondido, have the capability
of impacting the lives of every citizen in the respective localities.
One must only look at the consequences in the city of Riverside,
New Jersey to understand the gravity of the situation. Hundreds,
123. Councilman Tim O'Hare stated that, at least in part, "illegal immigrants" were
the cause of lowered property values in the locality, and in turn "less desirable people
move into the neighborhoods, people who don't value education, people who don't
value taking care of their properties." Stephanie Sandoval, Farmers Branch Proposal
Would Target Illegal Immigrants, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, August 21, 2006, available
at http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/dn/latestnews/stories/082106
dnmetfbimmigration.349844e.html. In addition, Councilman O'Hare stated that
"illegal immigrants" caused the local school rankings to drop and forced retailers to
tailor their services to "low-income and Spanish speaking customers," which left those
with a good income no place to shop. Id.
124. Kranson v. Valley Crest Nursing Home, 755 F. 2d 46, 53 (3d Cir. 1985).
125. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632-33 (1996).
554
20081 IMMIGRANTS' ACCESS TO HOUSING
possibly thousands of documented and undocumented immigrants
fled the city before the ordinance was even enforced.'26 This mass
exodus severely harmed the city's economy, with little hope for
future growth.
127
Another prime example of the impact that such ordinances
have on individuals can be seen from Pedro Lozano's point of view.
Mr. Lozano came to the United States from Colombia. 128 He is a
legal resident who settled in Hazleton, Pennsylvania. 129 He pur-
chased a two-family home with the intention of renting some of
the space and using the proceeds from the rental to help pay his
mortgage. 130 Mr. Lozano rented the home until the ordinance was
passed in Hazleton, and the tenants he was renting to "ran away"
after he told them they would have to obtain a permit to rent from
him. 13' He has had difficulty finding other renters.3 2
An additional example involves another plaintiff from the
Hazleton case. He was referred to as John Doe 1.13 He had filed
the necessary paperwork with the federal government to obtain
legal residency.3 3 Nevertheless, his landlord forced him from his
rental property shortly after the ordinance was passed because his
landlord did not want to pay the fine. 35
How courts treat the ordinances discussed above will set the
stage for the hundreds of ordinances that are being debated in
localities across the United States. Although in this author's opin-
ion Judge Munley's decision is, for the most part, on the right
track, it is currently being appealed.'36
In addition, three recent Federal District Court opinions took
contrary positions to several of Judge Munley's rulings.'37 These
decisions are based on laws that impose fines on employers who
126. See Belson & Capuzzo, supra note 67.
127. Id.
128. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 469 F. Supp. 2d 477, 488 (2007).




133. Id. at 498.
134. Id. at 499.
135. Id.
136. Julia Preston, In Reversal, Courts Uphold Local Immigration Laws, N.Y.
TIMES, February 10, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/10/us/
l0immig.html?_r=1&sq=in%20reversal,%20courts%20uphold&st=nyt&adxnnl=1&
oref=slogin&scp=1&adxnnlx=1204563709-1iKQMWeQiPkUgAclz5Og.
137. See Gray v. City of Valley Park, Mo., WL 294294 (E.D.Mo. 2008); Arizona
Contractors Ass'n, Inc. v. Candelaria, WL 343082 (D. Ariz. 2008); National Coalition
of Latino Clergy, Inc. v. Henry, WL 4390650 (N.D. Okla., 2007).
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hire undocumented immigrants, which is not the subject dis-
cussed in this paper, but many of the issues are the same. In par-
ticular, the court in National Coalition of Latino Clergy, Inc., v.
Henry, held that undocumented immigrants did not possess pru-
dential standing to challenge the ordinance in question because if
the plaintiffs complied with federal law and left the country or
sought legal immigration status there would be no issue."' 8 In
both Arizona Contractors Assoc. Inc., v. Candelaria and Gray v.
City of Valley Park, Mo., the courts held that the laws were not
preempted because the local and federal laws could live in har-
mony."' Subsequently, the respective courts analyzed due process
challenges and found that the procedures offered by the ordi-
nances were sufficient. 140 The Gray court went even further to
hold that the law in question did not violate Hispanics' equal pro-
tection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment because undocu-
mented immigrants did not qualify as a suspect class.141  The
court based its decision on the finding that there was insufficient
evidence to conclude that the law was racially motivated and the
city had provided ample justification under the rational basis test
to satisfy the court of its validity.'
Although these recent decisions were based on ordinances
dealing solely with employment of undocumented immigrants,
many of the issues are the same as those discussed throughout
this paper, and they demonstrate that the issues presented by
such laws are far from settled. Lawmakers will almost certainly
continue to craft laws that adversely affect the lives of undocu-
mented immigrants, documented immigrants and American citi-
zens of Mexican and Latin American descent.14 ' Therefore, it is
imperative that the courts and practitioners be aware of the legal
tools at their disposal so they may more effectively combat such
laws, in whatever form they are presented. As Judge Munley
138. National Coalition of Latino Clergy, Inc., WL 4390650 at 28.
139. Arizona Contractors Ass'n, Inc. v. Candelaria, WL 343082 at 35; Gray v. City of
Valley Park, Mo., WL 294294 at 56.
140. Arizona Contractors Ass'n, Inc. v. Candelaria, WL 343082 at 24; Gray v. City of
Valley Park, Mo., WL 294294 at 56.
141. Gray v. City of Valley Park, Mo., WL 294294 at 56.
142. Id.
143. Shortly after Judge Munley handed down his decision granting a permanent
injunction against the Hazleton ordinance, Dan Stein, president of the Federation of
American Immigration Reform, stated 'Attorneys have already drafted appeal briefs.'
Darryl Fears, Judge Blocks City's Ordinance Against Illegal Immigration, WASH.
POST, July 27, 2007, at A2. In addition, Louis J. Barletta, Hazleton's Mayor and
strong supporter of the ordinance, said "[tihis fight is far from over. I have said it
many times before: Hazleton is not going to back down." Id.
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stated in Lozano, "We cannot say clearly enough that persons who
enter this country without legal authorization are not stripped
immediately of all their rights because of this single illegal act."'
144. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 469 F. Supp. 2d 477, 498 (2007).
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